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I. INTRODUCTION
An opinion of a judicial decision is a special kind of statement. It is an out-
come of, on the one hand, the fulfilment of a procedural duty imposed on the 
court and, on the other, a need, stemming from social and cultural consider-
ations, to give reasons for an imperative decision taken towards other persons 
or entities.1 Therefore, the way it is prescribed to be drawn up by the court 
combines ‘formal’ characteristics and elements giving its author some leeway. 
The basic provisions on an opinion structure refer to the opinion of a judgment 
and are similar in all judicial proceedings. They give the principal components 
of an opinion with their general descriptions (as for instance in the Act on 
Administrative Court Procedure, Article 141 para. 4, pursuant to which an 
opinion should give ‘a concise presentation of the case’).2 They are to be filled 
with specific content left to the discretion of an opinion draftsman. In this 
situation, admittedly, a certain practice has developed in the courts, but still 
some detailed aspects reflect the individual preferences of the draftsman. Due 
to the need to keep opinions flexible, in particular because there may always 
come up unforeseeable cases, and the complexity (many-sidedness) of opinion 
drafting,3 it is not possible to prescribe—neither formally nor by agreeing on 
a single opinion drafting practice—the structure of an opinion in a fixed, final 
and only right manner that would be detached from individual preferences of 
expression. 
∗ Translation of the paper into English has been financed by the Minister of Science and 
Higher Education as part of agreement no. 541/P-DUN/2016. Translated by Tomasz Żebrowski. 
(Editor's note.)
1 For differences in giving opinions by courts between autocratic and democratic countries 
see: E. Łętowska et al., Podstawy uzasadniania w prawie konstytucyjnym i międzynarodowym, in: 
I. Rzucidło-Grochowska, M. Grochowski (eds.), Uzasadnienia decyzji stosowania prawa, Warsaw, 
2015: 15–16.
2 The provisions regulating the structure of an opinion include the Act on Administrative 
Court Procedure [Prawo o postępowaniu przed sądami administracyjnymi], Article 141 para. 4, 
Code of Civil Procedure [Kodeks postępowania cywilnego], Article 328 para. 2 and Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure [Kodeks postępowania karnego], Article 424.
3 For the complexity of judicial opinion drafting see I. Rzucidło, Wielowymiarowość 
uzasadnienia decyzji stosowania prawa, in: M. Żuralska (ed.), Interdyscyplinarne ujęcie prawa. 
Materiały ogólnopolskiej konferencji naukowej „Prawo i…” Zasadność interdyscyplinarnego ujęcia 
prawa, Warszawa 2–3 grudnia 2011 r., Warsaw, 2013. 
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The leeway given to a judge as the author of an opinion is variously used 
by him/her, depending on individual preferences and competences in judicial 
opinion drafting. This can be seen in text editing (for instance use of num-
bering or headings)4 or in particular wording, rhetorical devices and ways of 
reasoning. The last-mentioned item is in fact the question of using suitable 
strategies and techniques of argumentation, distinguished within the cat-
egory of argumentation style, considered at the level of the general suitabil-
ity of argumentation and not as a style following from the characteristics of 
a given legal system.5 Since the question of argumentation style is unusually 
rich and merits attention going beyond the scope of a scholarly paper, this 
exposition shall focus on the strategies and techniques of drawing up judicial 
opinions. The conclusions formulated below are the effect of an extensive 
study of judicial decisions, above all judicial opinions, and publications on 
opinion drafting. The point of departure was, for the most part, the study of 
administrative court opinions, but its findings are nonetheless rather more 
universal and extend in principle to opinions drawn up by other courts. The 
findings are accompanied by the presentation of the most interesting and 
significant strategies, and techniques of argumentation observed, while ad-
mitting that there are more specific varieties to be found in particular types 
of proceedings. 
Judicial opinions are believed in practice (the law is silent on this matter) 
to consist in principle of two structural elements: the so-called historical and 
legal parts. The former gives the description of the case history and—against 
this background—the findings of fact, while the latter contains legal delib-
erations (in a way, it reflects acts leading to the findings of law). Sometimes, 
a part devoted to the presentation and assessment of evidence is distinguished 
as a separate part of the opinion or an element of the historical or legal part. 
The strategies and techniques of drawing up an opinion are found to be used 
with respect to both principal opinion parts but the more natural space for the 
use of techniques is thought to be the legal part, because it gives more leeway 
as to its content than the historical part. The latter is largely defined by the 
statements of the parties and other persons or entities and the circumstances 
of the case, and the like. 
4 The question of text organisation and editing goes beyond the scope of this paper and merits 
special attention. 
5 The category of argumentation style is not uniformly understood in all legal systems. 
A style characteristic of a given legal system is a separate conceptual category, to be found 
at another level than the other means of looking at this phenomenon. In this approach, it is 
the emanation of law enforcement assumptions and law observance itself, with three basic 
styles of drawing up opinions being distinguished: French, German and Anglo-American. 
Zob. E. Łętowska, Pozaprocesowe znaczenie uzasadnienia sądowego, Państwo i Prawo 52(5), 
1997: 3–5. 
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II. ARGUMENTATION STRATEGIES
As mentioned above, the manner of opinion content presentation is de-
cided by strategies adopted for this purpose by the draftsman. They decide 
how the narration pursued in the opinion is to be created and are conducive 
to the achievement of goals set by the draftsman. The goals, in turn, are de-
fined by other factors, in particular by the intended readers of the opinion. An 
opinion seems in this context to be a game played with its readers. Strategies 
are used, as mentioned earlier, in drawing up both parts of an opinion, albeit 
differently. It is worth noticing that some strategies are mutually exclusive, 
while others may be used in parallel.6
1. Strategies for drafting the historical part of an opinion
The historical part of an opinion is drawn up (or at least it ought to be) 
with an eye primarily to its legal part.7 Its individual elements are selected 
according to what the contents of the legal part are going to be. The histori-
cal part becomes thus a particular instrument of dialogue between the court 
and the addressees of its message, showing (inevident at first glance) a quite 
considerable rhetorical potential. 
1.1. Detailed citing of elements
One of the strategies in this respect is a detailed citing of elements char-
acteristic of the historical part: statements by parties, occurrences in the case, 
allegations raised on appeal, entire pleadings and other documents on record 
6 A different opinion on strategies (in relation to a different legal system) is expressed by 
B.M. Atkins, Decision-making rules and judicial strategy on the United States courts of appeals, 
The Western Political Quarterly 25(4), 1972: 626f. Por. także M.A. Perino, Law, ideology, and 
strategy in judicial decison making: evidence from securities fraud actions, Journal of Empirical 
Legal Studies 2006, no. 3: 505f, in which the author listed various models of decision making 
and arguing: ‘legal model’—decision and opinion based on law, ‘attitudinal model’—on one’s own 
preferences as to values and political views, and ‘strategic model’—geared to the achievement of 
a goal. See also M. Bergara et al., Modeling Supreme Court strategic decision making: the con-
gressional constraint, Legislative Studies Quarterly 28(2), 2003: 247ff.; P.T. Spiller et al., Stra-
tegic judicial decision making, NBER Working Paper No. 13321, <http://www.nber.org/papers/
w13321> [accessed 3 March 2017]. For adjudication models similar to the presented argument 
strategies see P. Weiler, Two models of judicial decision-making, Canadian Bar Review 1968, no. 
3: 408. See also interesting comments, although on another kind of decisions in O. Bachelet, Le 
Conseil constitutionnel valide la motivation elliptique des verdicts d’assises, Lettre „Actualités 
Droits-Libertés” du CREDOF, 4 April 2011. For another view of strategies see T.R. van Geel, 
Understanding Supreme Court Opinions, Harlow, 2007: 117f. 
7 Also in situations where the decision is only formal (as for instance with the withdrawal 
of a cassation complaint) and only procedural questions can be raised without citing allegations 
made by the party, because then they are irrelevant for the decision. Thus, the content of the 
historical part is selected with an eye to this decision. See the decisions of the Supreme Admin-
istrative Court of: 8 May 2013, II FSK 1840/11; 9 May 2013, II OSK 347/13; 9 May 2013, II GSK 
376/12; 27 March 2013, II FSK 755/13; 21 May 2013, II OZ 384/13 (irrelevance of staying the 
execution of an appealed decision, owing to the prior rendition of a judgment in the case).
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(making up the factual state and additional historical background of the case). 
Sometimes, even those elements of a historical part are cited in detail that are 
not closely related to the legal problem at hand or do not correspond to the 
antecedent of the legal norm applicable to the case. 
This overloading of a historical part is to defend the court against the 
charge of a wrong determination of facts in the case and, consequently, the 
reversal of the decision or its negative assessment outside the court-hierarchy 
review system. From the point of view of the reviewing court, however, such 
an opinion may give rise to serious doubts whether the trial court has un-
derstood the core of the problem on which the case rested. The overloading, 
however, may be understandable if one considers the fact that the chief task 
of a trial court is to determine the facts in the case.8 
The second reason why this strategy is used is to give the impression that 
since all this information has been included in the historical part of an opin-
ion, it has been carefully determined, assessed and considered by the court 
while making a determination. This is conducive to the phenomenon that can 
be called ‘legitimating by appearances’, that is, manipulating the contents of 
an opinion so that its reader gets an impression of an exhaustive and detailed 
reflection. So understood, this strategy is characteristic not only of ordinary 
trial courts, but also other courts whose decisions are subject to review: within 
or without the court-hierarchy system or by parties to proceedings or other 
persons/entities in an informal manner. 
A special variety of this strategy involves citing the allegations raised on 
appeal, often without condensing or paraphrasing (in extenso,9 or sometimes 
even in crudo).10 The purpose of such a measure is to show a party that its 
doubts have been given careful consideration and thoroughly examined (es-
pecially when the court is bound by the limits of the appeal). Moreover, it is 
also meant to demonstrate that the court has understood allegations raised by 
a party. Paradoxically, sometimes it may give the impression of superficiality. 
It is crucial, however, how the allegations are referred to in the legal part of 
the opinion: it is the manner of this reference that ultimately determines the 
argumentative value of the court’s reasoning. 
The bloating of a historical part may suggest that the court’s input into its 
drawing up has been rather small, limited to copying the contents of the case 
file, in particular the pleadings. When the historical part is hypertrophied, the 
8 F. Błahuta, Uzasadnianie orzeczenia pierwszej instancji w sprawie cywilnej, Biuletyn 
Ministerstwa Sprawiedliwości 1955, no. 4; idem, Uzasadnienie orzeczenia pierwszej instancji 
w sprawie cywilnej (wskazówki praktyczne), Biuletyn Ministerstwa Sprawiedliwości 1955, 
no. 4.
9 Slightly re-worded allegations are not rare. Cf. SAC judgments: of 22 March 2013, II OSK 
2259/11; of 18 September 2012, II OSK 1393/12; and 7 March 2013, I GSK 1258/11. 
10 Quoting practically unprocessed allegations can be observed by analysing the writing style 
and manner of referring to legislation and parties to proceedings (for example use of lowercase 
and uppercase letters throughout the findings of fact). M. Domagalski, Kopiuj/wklej w wyroku, 
Rzeczpospolita 20 December 2011.
Strategies and techniques used in the preparation of judicial opinions 63
legal part cannot often match it in terms of volume, which results in a slightly 
grotesque effect.11 
1.2. Condensing
Another strategy employed in drawing up the historical part involves con-
densing its individual elements. This may take the form of either selecting 
the most important information from the entire case file (for instance, citing 
selected pleadings and passing over those that are irrelevant to the determi-
nation of the case) or writing a précis of all the facts and occurrences in the 
case. It is used especially when the drafted opinion refers to a decision by an 
appellate court that is already unlikely to be subject to review. Hence, there 
is no fear that the omission of an element of factual issues, relevant to the 
determination, will meet with censure. 
Giving the details of the factual basis of the case and the course of proceed-
ings so far is not necessary in this case also because the parties thereto, to 
whom an opinion is addressed most of the time, either know these details well 
or are only mildly interested in them insofar as they are necessary to grasp 
the legal part. 
This strategy is used especially in drafting the judicial opinions of appel-
late court decisions also because at this stage of case cognisance, the legal 
problem to be determined is clearly discernible. Trial courts, for pragmatic 
reasons, often give their opinions on all aspects of the case. Sometimes only 
on a successive cognisance level, in particular after considering allegations 
raised on appeal, which frequently give direction to the determination of the 
case, can the crux of the matter be seen. Then, the historical part may focus 
on these elements that correspond with a specific determination, omitting or 
briefly going over the others. This is particularly well seen in administrative 
court opinions, especially those of the SAC, which is bound by the limits of the 
allegations raised in the cassation complaint. Then, the court considers above 
all these allegations in the legal part and, consequently, the factual basis giv-
en in the historical part of the opinion, correlated with the legal deliberations 
of the court, concentrates on the same.
The use of this strategy by the courts placed higher in the judiciary hier-
archy is by no means a rule. The historical parts of appellate court opinions 
tend to be more detailed when they are drawn up in relation to a decision hav-
ing the nature of a ‘precedent’ or for some other reason attracting a broader 
discussion (e.g. of a resolution), regardless of the court that has originally 
rendered it. The opinions of supreme courts, in particular when they decide 
precedent cases, are usually addressed to a larger group of readers: the legal 
community and the public at large. This is a result of the high esteem the deci-
sions of these courts enjoy, owing to their high position in the structure of the 
11 For more on the hypertrophy of the historical part of opinions see: M. Grochowski, 
Uzasadnienie orzeczenia sądu drugiej instancji i jego deficyty (studium przypadku), Państwo 
i Prawo 69(2), 2014.
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judiciary. Whence comes the need of providing a broader factual background 
to the decision which, together with the legal part, gives the full picture of the 
ruling. 
2. Strategies for drafting the legal part of an opinion
2.1. Discourse
With respect to the legal part of an opinion, there are two major strategies 
used for its drafting. The first, known as ‘discursive’, ‘reactive’ or referential 
consists in affirming (approving) or questioning assertions and arguments 
raised by the parties or other facts/statements on record by successively dis-
cussing them—treating each of them as a separate problem to be discussed. 
Hence, this strategy is strongly oriented towards commenting by formulating 
arguments. Obviously, it is most often found in those opinion portions that are 
addressed mainly to the parties to proceedings. For an opinion to be fully dis-
cursive, it is necessary to quote statements by the party (in particular allega-
tions raised) in the historic part and discuss each in the legal deliberations.12 
In the extreme form, the opinion draftsman answers every quoted argument, 
even the most absurd or irrelevant, by giving a counter-argument of a strictly 
matter-of-fact character.13 Thereby, the court shows above all that it treats 
seriously each case as well as its respect for the citizen—following from the 
position of the court in a democratic country. 
The discursive strategy is also used when the court is aware that the party 
or its counsel will study the determination and may draw arguments from it 
to be used on appeal in an effort to verify it. A similar situation is encountered 
with a higher court reversing a defective decision, when its reasoning is sub-
ject to review. Aware that a decision (or rather: arguments cited in its support) 
may be subjected to review by another organ, the court will draw up its opin-
ion so as to present and explain best the arguments that have underlain it. 
2.2. Monologue
The second strategy may be called a ‘monologue’ one14 for it takes the form 
of a written argument on a legal question that has been raised in the case (or 
a legal institution applicable to it) or a proposal how to resolve questions relat-
ed to it. Crucially, however, in neither of the two forms is any reference made 
to assertions formulated by the parties. A judicial opinion drafted in this way 
12 See for instance the SAC judgment of 5 April 2013, I FSK 840/12; Warsaw CoA judgment 
of 18 January 2017, II AKa 466/16; Warsaw CoA judgment of 30 December 2016, II AKa 190/16; 
DC judgment of 30 June 2004, VIII K 495/03; Łódź CoA judgment of 9 April 2015, I ACa 1502/14. 
13 See SAC decision of 15 May 2013, II OZ 359/13. 
14 The monologue and discursive strategies should not be confused with discursive and mag-
isterial (monologue) styles distinguished in L. Morawski, M. Zirk-Sadowski, Precedent in Poland, 
in: N. MacCormick, R. Summers (eds.), Interpreting Precedents. A Comparative Study, Dart-
mouth, 1997: 225–226. 
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is not a discourse with the assertions, allegations and arguments raised by 
the parties or the evidence accumulated in the case, but is rather a monologue 
presenting the one and only possible point of view, at least in the court’s belief. 
It resembles sometimes the solution of a moot case where the court presents 
its view with a lesser or greater amount of references to the realities of a given 
case. This strategy is employed to the full where the draftsman is unable—due 
to the tortuousness or irrelevance of statements by persons/entities appearing 
in the case—to discuss every assertion or circumstance separately or where 
finding and citing counter-arguments seems too difficult (especially when one 
adjudicates relying to some extent on the inner sense of what is right in the 
legal culture based on the enforcement of written law). The result is an elabo-
rate statement with the underscoring of constitutional, European or interna-
tional aspects (with respect to both law and judicial decisions).
The use of this strategy may be motivated by the role and position of ap-
pellate courts; it is these courts that most often draft opinions in this way. 
They do not have to fear that their decision will be set aside, because some 
assertions have been left unanswered. Next to its obvious disadvantages, this 
strategy serves the purpose of demonstrating, at least it is intended that way, 
the strongest competence to make autonomous decisions on cases. Further-
more, it may help fulfil the role of these courts to formulate ideas of a more 
universal nature. Last but not least, the use of the monologue strategy may 
have purely pragmatic reasons; such an opinion is easier to draft. 
III. ARGUMENTATION TECHNIQUES
Strategies give the arguments of opinions their overall structure. Within 
strategies, there are also certain techniques, emphasising particular aspects 
of the opinion in its both parts. They are more concrete measures that, how-
ever, do not alter the overall structure of argumentation set by strategies. 
Specific techniques may be employed to introduce arguments within these 
concrete strategies that do not totally exclude their use, which clearly reflects 
the pragmatics of adjudication. Unlike strategies, which in principle cannot 
be used at the same time in their respective opinion parts, techniques may be 
used in parallel in both the entire opinion and its individual parts. 
The techniques listed below are only examples of many possible argumen-
tation techniques; it is absolutely certain that not all have been identified 
yet as they make use of a myriad of detailed drafting tools such as the use of 
specific expressions or linguistic constructions. 
The techniques discussed below have been chosen as the most interesting—
almost all appear to be atypical. They may give an apparently rather negative 
picture of the court as an institution, seeking to shape its statement for other 
purposes than those commonly accepted and revealed in the opinion. The list, 
however, does not exhaust the entire gamut of techniques that courts use with-
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in the limits of the discretion that is left to them to draw up their opinions. In 
each case, however, they are instruments to achieve a specific effect by opinion 
draftsmen. 
1. Ornamentation 
One of the major techniques is ornamentally citing the juristic literature 
and judicial decisions in the opinion allegedly in support of the court’s own 
views on the case, but actually without any relation to the court’s own rea-
soning.15 It usually takes the form of either quoting suitable theses or pas-
sages or adducing them by giving a file number or bibliographical details.16 
This technique is meant to give the impression that the case involves a major 
legal problem, calling for a serious study, testifies to a significant amount of 
work done by the court and the draftsman him-/herself and is used when the 
determination itself does not find an entirely stable foundation in positive law 
(its foundation is different, for instance, equity reasons). The citing of state-
ments by other persons or institutions then is not so important for the deci-
sion rendered, by strengthening the real motivation behind the determination 
by citing, for instance, constitutionally protected values, as it legitimates the 
reasoning of the opinion.17 
2. ‘Omission of the obvious’
One of the techniques, which is rather characteristic of only the monologue 
strategy, is the ‘omission of the obvious’. It comes down to the citing of the 
principle clara non sunt interpretanda18 (directly, as a paraphrase or by impli-
cation) as a means of avoiding the need to present one’s own argumentation 
(on the rhetorical level in the opinion, however, not always as an element of 
the court’s reasoning). Drawn up thus, the legal part is deprived of its very es-
sence and can be called an ‘opinion without an opinion’. From the argumenta-
15 Ch. A. Newland, Innovation in judicial technique: the Brandeis opinion, Seminar Proceed-
ings, Idaho State College 9 February1960: 5.
16 Quoting judicial decisions lends, in turn, prestige to quoted decisions—see F.B. Cross et al., 
Citations in the U.S. Supreme Court: an empirical study of their use and significance, University 
of Illinois Law Review 2010, no. 2(18): 489f. 
17 Por. szerzej: I. Rzucidło-Grochowska, Argumentacja konstytucyjna w uzasadnieniach 
orzeczeń sądów administracyjnych. Znaczenie i typologia, in: J. Sułkowski et al. (eds.), Kontrola 
konstytucyjności prawa a stosowanie prawa w orzecznictwie NSA, SN i TK, forthcoming. On the 
need to use rhetorical devices when strong legal arguments are lacking, see. R. Moss, Rhetorical 
stratagems in judicial opinions, Scribes Journal of Legal Writing 1991, no. 2: 104.
18 Farther: T. Grzybowski, Spory wokół reguły clara non sunt interpretanda, Państwo 
i Prawo 67(9), 2012; Z. Tobor, W poszukiwaniu intencji prawodawcy, Warsaw, 2013: 24f.; M. Zirk-
Sadowski, Trzy ujęcia zasady clara non sunt interpretanda jako zakazu inicjowania interpretacji, 
in: System prawa administracyjnego, ed. R. Hauser, Z. Niewiadomski, A. Wróbel, vol. 4: 
Wykładnia w prawie administracyjnym, ed. L. Leszczyński, B. Wojciechowski, M. Zirk-Sadowski, 
Warsaw, 2012: 156–159.
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tive perspective, finding clear a given regulation forestalls any further discus-
sion, allowing the court to refrain from arguing something that is supposedly 
obvious.19 It is used in most cases, however, only with an ostensible conviction 
about the clarity of a regulation, with the real purpose being to mask the true 
intention—to avoid arguing a difficult or complex question.20 The use of this 
element of the clarification conception of legal interpretation may take the 
form of ‘direct obviousness’, already mentioned above, and ‘implied obvious-
ness’. The implied use of this element of the clarification conception involves 
leaving out specific content from the opinion (reasoning and arguments in its 
favour) when the opinion draftsman considers it obvious (or wishes that it 
were so considered) and implicitly communicates this by omitting it from his/
her line of argument.21 
Another problem with this technique is the avoidance of subsumption. 
This is a clear deficiency of the legal part of many opinions. In most cases, it is 
not intentional but rather a result of disregarding the need to give expression 
to an apparently obvious question in the opinion. Another cause of the defi-
ciency may be the unawareness on the part of the draftsman that this element 
of law enforcement, sometimes taking place almost automatically, should be 
included in the opinion. 
3. Excessive expatiation
Yet another technique to legitimate an argument, applicable to the legal 
part of opinions rendered by courts of any kind and rank may be called ‘exces-
sive expatiation’. This involves citing a large number of views from the juristic 
literature and judicial decisions as in the ornamentation technique but unlike 
it, the citations show a connection to the court’s actual reasoning in the case 
(for instance, they have become an interpretation argument in the decision-
making process). This technique is employed to show that the problem posed 
by the case has been carefully analysed from many angles and thus legitimate 
its determination. The heavy reliance on the juristic literature and judicial 
19 A court using this measure contradicts itself by claiming that legal provisions are clear and 
should not be interpreted, because such a claim in itself is tantamount to an interpretation. For 
it is not possible to attribute an objective property, such as clarity, to anything in a subjective 
manner.
20 This is particularly well seen in the case of decisions rendered in camera in matters—in 
principle—of minor importance addressed most of the time to a very limited number of address-
ees—mostly parties to proceedings. Such opinions on many occasions lack the reflection of the 
subsumption phase, which means that the message comes down to only authoritative assertions. 
A similar situation is encountered when general clauses are filled with content. The use—directly 
or implicitly—of the criterion of clarity and obviousness of legislation as a flight from giving the 
motives of one’s decision considerably detracts from the prestige of the court in the eyes of the 
addressees of the opinion. 
21 P.M. Wald, The rhetoric of results and the results of rhetoric: judicial writings, The Univer-
sity of Chicago Law Review 62(4), 1995: 1373.
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decisions is a sign of searching for external references (authorities) to make 
the decision more readily acceptable.22 
The above technique has both clear advantages and shortcomings. A prob-
lem with its use and perception as inappropriate in some situations lies in 
the fact that excessive citing of jurists’ views and judicial decisions not only 
shows the amount of work done on the case, but mainly shows off erudition in 
extreme cases. As a result, the legal part of the opinion unnecessarily grows 
out of proportion. 
Similarly, long-winded stories about the essence and origins of, and prob-
lems with using, a specific legal institution (admittedly applicable to the case) 
despite the fact that these issues are not controversial in judicial decisions 
and jurisprudence, is sometimes simply redundant for the case determination 
even if the court’s reasoning has relied on it to a degree. The use of this tech-
nique may distract attention from the main problem to be decided in the case, 
wrongly place emphasis in the opinion (for instance marginalise subsumption) 
and, consequently, make the opinion less readable. 
Paradoxically, the use of this technique may be detrimental to the recep-
tion of an opinion by showing a huge effort put in the making of the decision 
and drafting the opinion which, however, on many an occasion, is dispropor-
tionate to the ultimate effect (for example determination of a typical problem 
in an incidental case). 
However, in some situations, demonstrating that an identical position has 
many a time been taken on a point of law in both jurisprudence and judicial 
decisions may serve the purpose of confirming and strengthening the view of 
the court expressed in the opinion. Such situations include above all the de-
terminations of a difficult case or one coming up before the courts for the first 
time. Then, the court may in part seek support (in respect of one of the threads 
of its reasoning) in an established view, and in part, in respect of which juris-
prudence or courts have not had an opportunity to voice their opinion, rely on 
one’s own means. Used in this combination, the technique in question facili-
tates the acceptance of the decision, which, admittedly, is not arrived at en-
tirely autonomously, but is consistent, at least to some extent, with the views 
of jurisprudence and judicature accumulated hitherto. 
Another advantage of this technique is the fact that an opinion drawn up 
making use of it may be treated as a sign of affording the case serious atten-
tion, even in a typical situation where it could be excusable to use other deci-
sions as models. 
It must be remembered, however, that between quoting the views of juris-
prudence and the judicature for the purposes that no doubt serve the latter 
well and their unjustified excessive citing, that is harmful to the judicature, 
there lies a very fine line indeed. 
22 In the case of references to judicial decisions, one can speak of the search for an external-
internal authority—still a part of the judicature, but outside the specific process of law enforce-
ment in a given case.
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4. Pretermission
Another technique used in the historical part, but having a direct impact 
on the legal one, is pretermission. It may take many forms. The most popular 
one sees the opinion draftsman ignore certain elements of the historical part 
(especially assertions or allegation by the parties) so that he/she does not have 
to discuss them in the legal part. In addition, problem issues that are hard to 
discuss and yet have no bearing on the case can be pretermitted. These are 
frequently situations where a decision would take a concrete shape anyway, 
regardless of whether the court discussed a given issue or not (for example 
when an appeal would be quashed anyway as groundless and one of the ap-
pellant’s arguments—although not decisive—would call for complex counter-
arguments). Another example involves absurd assertions by a party, far from 
the merits of the case, as for instance insisting on letting the court know one’s 
emotions and opinions (sense of being wronged, descriptions of personal rela-
tions with the other party to the proceedings, pleading for mercy, and the 
like). Discussing such assertions by the court, especially when done at length 
and unskilfully, could expose the opinion to ridicule.23 Treating such asser-
tions as legitimate only apparently would give the impression of treating the 
case seriously. It appears that, paradoxically, only in few cases do attempts to 
discuss unsubstantial assertions on their merits build a positive image of the 
administration of justice.24 
5. Bias
Still another technique is one that has been referred to in the juristic lit-
erature as manipulating the facts (embellishing).25 Actually, it is about exhib-
iting bias in opinions. This is done by stressing these elements that support 
the determination selected by the court and omitting those opposing it in the 
opinion, especially in its historical part. Opinions drawn up in evidence of 
a foregone conclusion stress only arguments in favour of the selected view, 
while covering or even concealing arguments to the contrary or ones that do 
not unequivocally speak in favour of a particular stance. Poignant illustra-
tions include highlighting facts testifying to the defendant’s guilt or the re-
23 Concessions of the type: ‘although the court understands the difficult situation the party is 
in, but …’ seem acceptable.
24 In a sense, as an example may serve a decision circulating in the judicial community, in the 
opinion of which the judge at length and in a scholarly manner demonstrated that the claimant 
had no personal copyright in the Scriptures (Bible). 
25 R. Moss, op. cit.: 106. For more on manipulation in judicial opinions see: K. Schmidt, 
Uzasadnienia sądowe jako impuls zwrotny dla teorii, in: M. Sadowski, P. Szymaniec (eds.), 
Prace z historii oraz teorii prawa i administracji publicznej, Acta Erasmiana IV, Wrocław, 
2012: 11f. 
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sponsibility of the person causing damage, or using stylistically-marked epi-
thets in order to convey an impression intended by the draftsman (for example 
defendant’s brutality or absence of guilt). This is intended to build a conviction 
in the reader about the fairness of the decision rendered. Such a conviction, 
however, rests not so much on substantial arguments as on impressions, at-
titudes or emotions.
6. Review
Still another technique is used in drawing up the opinions of decisions 
rendered by appellate or administrative courts (that review decisions ren-
dered by lower courts or executive agencies, and other entities). Its use 
entails designing the legal part in two different ways, depending on the 
preferences of the draftsman and circumstances accompanying the deter-
mination of the case. In the first, characteristic of the discursive strategy, 
the draftsman separately discusses each argument or assertion made in 
a pleading only to say next that their acceptance or rejection results in the 
court’s making a specific determination. The discussion of arguments or as-
sertions includes not only purely referential comments, but also may indi-
cate—for the sake of contrasting—the correct reasoning in the case. In the 
second, seemingly similar to the monologue strategy but finding application 
mainly in its discursive counterpart, the draftsman, while assessing the 
legitimacy of an appeal or simply examining the assertions made by a party 
or discussing the case file, presents first the model determination of the case 
(possibly assessing from this point of view, as a consequence, the decision 
under review) and then confronts it with assertions made by the parties in 
pleadings, dealing with successive arguments offered there. In the latter 
case, it is clear that from a trial (but also theoretical) point of view, it would 
suffice to present an ideal model of the determination of the case, while dis-
cussing the assertions made by the parties is an added value of the opinion. 
This technique is meant to show an individual, not conventional approach 
to the case and opinion on it. Furthermore, responding to each assertion 
made by a party (in particular those going in an opposite direction to that of 
the decision) may give an impression that the determination is well thought 
out and that it could not possibly be different as the court is able to counter 
any argument. 
This technique is sometimes used with precedential decisions or ones 
determining a complex legal issue. Then, a general background is outlined 
first, which is an introduction to the understanding and application of a giv-
en legal institution as defined by the judge, followed by a concretisation with 
some references to the allegations raised. 
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IV. CONCLUSION
The distinction and employment of strategies, and especially techniques 
of drafting judicial opinion reveal a rift between discovery and opinion.26 The 
techniques, strategies and styles demonstrate that even if the opinion drafts-
man and the decision-maker are the same person, the mode of argumentation 
to reach a decision (at the level of reasoning) may differ from one employed 
when the decision has already been rendered. This is so because it is pos-
sible to use different argumentation while enforcing the law and next draw up 
a different written opinion, making use of specific strategies and techniques, 
irrespective of actual reasoning, to bring about a desired rhetorical (or com-
munication) effect. The variety of strategies and techniques shows that it is 
possible to build various narratives concerning the same decision even when 
something is to remain concealed (then, appropriate measures are employed). 
In a typical situation in which the court wishes to reveal the actual motives 
behind the decision, it can do this in many ways, too, by taking advantage of 
diverse strategies and techniques. It is these that help deliver the message in 
a particular way. 
An entirely separate category is made up of the opinions that do not fit into 
any of the above patterns. These are opinions void of any strategy in which 
the intention of their draftsmen is hard to fathom. Their potential readers are 
almost entirely ignored, while their drawing up is treated merely as paying lip 
service to requirements imposed by procedural law. 
Iwona Rzucidło-Grochowska
Judicial Law Enforcement Project Coordinator
Institute of Law Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw
rzucidloiwona@gmail.com
STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES USED
IN THE PREPARATION OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS
Summary
The structure of a judicial opinion is determined by specific legal provisions regulating 
particular kinds of proceedings. These provisions are of a general character and specify only 
the basic elements of judicial opinions, whereas endowing them with legal content is a task 
undertaken by their authors. This is effected by using strategies and techniques employed in 
the drafting of judicial opinions, which are pursuant to the desired result and instruments of 
26 Opinion draftsmen do not always give true decision motives—R.A. Leflar, Honest judicial 
opinions, Northwestern University Law Review 74(5), 1979: 721ff.
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law used for this purpose. Different strategies in the drafting of the ‘historical’ part of a judicial 
opinion (containing factual findings) and legal reasoning (that reflects the main judicial reason-
ing in the case) may be distinguished. The former category includes the strategies of detailed 
citing of elements of the historical part of a judicial opinion and to condense its respective 
elements. The latter includes the discursive and monologue strategies. Among the techniques 
used by drafters of judicial opinions in this context are ornamentation, omission of the obvious, 
excessive expatiation, pretermission, bias, or review.
